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Abstract
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model of production economies with adverse
selection in the financial market to study the interaction between funding liquidity and
market liquidity and its impact on business cycles. Entrepreneurs can take on short-term
collateralized debt and trade long-term assets to finance investment. Funding liquidity can
erode market liquidity. High funding liquidity discourages firms from selling their good
long-term assets since these good assets have to subsidize lemons when there is information
asymmetry. This can cause a liquidity dry-up in the market for long-term assets and even
a market breakdown, resulting in a financial crisis. Multiple equilibria can coexist. Credit
booms combined with changes in beliefs can cause equilibrium regime shifts, leading to an
economic crisis or expansion.
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1 Introduction
The goal of this paper is to study the interaction between funding liquidity and market liquid-
ity and its impact on business cycles. Following Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), we define
funding liquidity as the ease with which entrepreneurs can borrow, and market liquidity as the
ease with which they can obtain funds through trading of assets. Our key idea is that funding
liquidity can erode market liquidity in the presence of information asymmetries and adverse
selection in the financial markets (Akerlof (1970)). Allowing for more short-term borrowing
backed by collateralized real assets raises funding liquidity, which alleviates resource misallo-
cation by providing more efficient firms with more liquidity for investment and production.
High funding liquidity, however, reduces the need for liquidity from long-term assets and is
costly when adverse selection exists in the market for long-term assets. High funding liquidity
discourages firms from selling their good long-term assets since good assets have to subsidize
lemons. This can cause a liquidity dry-up in the market for long-term assets and even a market
breakdown, resulting in a financial crisis.
To formalize our idea, we build an infinite-horizon general equilibrium model of production
economies in which there is a continuum of entrepreneurs subject to idiosyncratic investment
efficiency shocks. Entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained and can use their physical capital as
collateral to borrow (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). They can also trade two types of long-term
assets to finance real investment. One type is a lemon, which is intrinsically useless and does
not deliver any payoffs. The other is a good asset and can deliver positive payoffs. Sellers know
the quality of the assets but buyers do not.
In the benchmark model under symmetric information, equilibrium is unique and lemons
are not traded. Although funding liquidity competes away some market liquidity, the total
liquidity still rises so that a credit boom always leads to an economic expansion. By contrast,
when there is asymmetric information about asset quality, three types of equilibrium can arise.
In a pooling equilibrium, both good assets and lemons are traded at a positive pooling price.
In a bubbly-lemon equilibrium, lemons are traded at a positive price and drive the good assets
out of the market. In a frozen equilibrium, the market for long-term assets breaks down. These
equilibria can be ranked in a decreasing order of steady-state capital stock.
We show that in some region of the parameter space all three types of equilibrium can coexist
depending on people’s self-fulfilling beliefs. In this region neither the payoff (fundamentals) of
the good assets nor the proportion of lemons can be too high or too low. If the fundamentals of
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the good assets are too weak, holders of the good assets will prefer to sell them to finance real
investment when a sufficiently high investment efficiency shock arrives, instead of holding them
to obtain low payoffs. Thus a bubbly lemon equilibrium cannot exist. But if the fundamentals
of the good assets are too strong, holders of these assets will prefer to hold on to them, and
these assets will never get traded. Thus a pooling equilibrium cannot exist. On the other hand,
if the proportion of lemons is too low, then the pooling price of the good assets will be high
enough for entrepreneurs with high investment efficiency to sell these assets to finance their
real investment. Thus a bubbly lemon equilibrium cannot exist. By contrast, if the proportion
of lemons is too high, then the adverse selection problem will be so severe that sellers are
unwilling to sell their good assets at a low pooling price. Thus a pooling equilibrium cannot
exist. In this case intrinsically useless lemons drive the good assets out of the market.
The mechanism for the coexistence of the three types of equilibrium is as follows. When all
agents optimistically believe that the asset price is high, entrepreneurs with sufficiently high
investment efficiency shocks will want to sell their good assets to finance investment. This
raises the proportion of good assets in the market and hence raises the asset price, supporting
the initial optimistic belief about the asset price. A pooling equilibrium can arise. On the
other hand, when all agents pessimistically believe that the asset price is sufficiently low, all
entrepreneurs will not sell their good assets, but sell lemons only. In this case the market will
consist of lemons only. Entrepreneurs with low investment efficiency shocks are willing to buy
lemons at a low positive price because they expect to sell lemons at a high positive price in
the future to finance investment when they are hit by a sufficiently high investment efficiency
shock. Then a bubbly lemon equilibrium can arise. In the extreme case, when all agents believe
that the assets have no value, no assets will be traded and the financial market will break down,
leading to a frozen equilibrium.
A credit boom through increased collateralized borrowing can cause a regime to shift from
one type of equilibrium to another. For example, when the economy is initially at a pooling
equilibrium, a sufficiently large permanent credit boom can cause a large competing effect so
that no good assets will be traded due to adverse selection. The economy will enter a bubbly
lemon equilibrium in which the intrinsically useless lemon is traded as a bubble asset at a
positive price. Since market liquidity has dried up, a financial crisis will arise.
Even a temporary credit boom can cause a regime shift through changes in confidence or
beliefs. In standard models with a unique steady state a temporary change in parameter values
will cause the economy to return to the original steady state eventually. By contrast, given
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that three types of equilibrium can coexist in our model, a change in confidence or beliefs can
cause the economy to switch from the original equilibrium to another type of equilibrium as
discussed previously. In a numerical example, we show that when the economy is initially at a
good pooling steady state and when agents pessimistically believe the economy will soon switch
to the bubbly lemon equilibrium in response to a temporary credit boom, market liquidity will
drop discontinuously and the economy will enter a recession eventually.
Not all credit booms end in a financial crisis. When there is no regime shift, a modest credit
boom can boost total liquidity and cause an economic expansion. If there is a regime shift,
the expansion can be large. For example, when the economy is initially at a bubbly lemon
equilibrium, a permanent modest credit boom can cause the economy to switch to a pooling
equilibrium. The asset price and output will rise to permanently higher levels eventually.
Our model can help explain the phenomenon that some credit booms lead to expansions and
others end in recessions. The idea that financial crises are due to credit booms gone wrong dates
back to Minsky (1977) and Kindleberger (1978) and is supported by some empirical studies
on emerging and advanced economies (McKinnon and Pill (1997), Kaminsky and Reinhart
(1999), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), and Schularick and Taylor
(2012)). However, using a sample of 61 emerging and industrial countries over the 1960-2010
period, Mendoza and Terrones (2012) find that the odds are about 1 to 4 that once a country
enters a credit boom it will end in a currency or a banking crisis, and a little less than 1 to
4 that it will end in a sudden stop. Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2015) find that there are 87 credit
booms in their sample of 34 countries over 1960-2010, of which 33 ended in financial crises.
Our model suggests that the interaction between funding liquidity and market liquidity under
adverse selection is useful to understand the preceding evidence.
Our paper is closely related to the one by Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2015) who also study the
question of why some credit booms result in financial crises while others do not. Unlike us,
they build an overlapping-generations model with adverse selection in which borrowers and
lenders have asymmetric information about the collateral quality. Firms finance investment
opportunities with short-term collateralized debt. If agents do not produce information about
the collateral quality, a credit boom develops, accommodating firms with lower quality projects
and increasing the incentives of lenders to acquire information about the collateral, eventually
triggering a crisis. When the average quality of investment opportunities also grows, the credit
boom may not end in a crisis because the gradual adoption of low quality projects is not strong
enough for lenders to acquire information about the collateral.
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Our idea that funding liquidity can erode market liquidity is related to Malherbe (2014).
He builds a three-date adverse selection model of liquidity in which cash holding by some
agents imposes a negative externality on others because it reduces future market liquidity. The
intuition for why holding cash worsens adverse selection is best understood from a buyer’s
point of view: the more cash a seller is expected to have on hand, the less likely it is that he
is trading to raise cash, and the more likely it is that he is trying to pass on a lemon. The
impact of funding liquidity in our paper is like that of cash holding in his paper, but our model
is very different from his. In particular, Malherbe (2014) assumes risk aversion for the agents
to make optimal portfolio choice decisions, while we do not need risk aversion. Moreover, his
model admits two types of equilibria, while ours admits three types.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) argue that funding liquidity and market liquidity are
mutually reinforcing in an endowment economy when margin requirements are endogenously
determined by the value-at-risk control. Unlike our paper, they do not consider real investment
and short-term debt backed by collateralized real assets. As in their paper, we show that
liquidity can be fragile because market liquidity can drop discontinuously due to equilibrium
regime shifts.
More broadly, our paper is related to the recent literature that uses adverse selection models
to explain financial crises and business cycles.1 Kurlat (2014) provides a dynamic model with
adverse selection in which firms are allowed to accumulate capital only and cannot trade other
types of assets. A fraction of capital can become useless lemons. Sellers know the quality of
capital, but buyers do not. In his model there can be only two types of equilibrium: either
capital is traded at a positive price or there is no trade at all. One key difference between
Kurlat (2014) and our paper is that the former shuts down the channel of funding liquidity and
focuses on the effect of adverse selection on market liquidity, while our paper incorporates trades
in short-term and long-term assets and studies the interaction between funding and market
liquidity under information asymmetry. Bigio (2015) studies an economy where asymmetric
information about the quality of capital endogenously determines liquidity. He presents a theory
where liquidity-driven recessions follow from surges in the dispersion of collateral quality.
Our paper is also related to Guerrieri and Shimer (2014) who study dynamic adverse se-
lection in asset markets.2 Their model has a unique equilibrium in which better quality assets
trade at higher prices but with a lower price-dividend ratio in less liquid markets. They also
1Our paper is also related to the large literature that studies business cycles with credit market frictions
(Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)).
2Guerrieri, Shimer, and Wright (2010) combine search frictions and adverse selection in a static model.
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study how asset purchase and subsidy programs may raise prices and liquidity and reverse the
flight to quality. But their model does not have real investment and production and does not
study the impact of credit booms on the real economy, which is the focus of our paper.3
As intrinsically useless lemons can have a positive price in our model, our paper is related to
the literature on rational bubbles. Since the seminal study by Santos and Woodford (1997), it
has been widely believed that it is hard to generate rational bubbles in competitive models with
infinitely lived agents. Recently, there has been a growing literature that introduces borrowing
constraints to study bubbles in infinite horizon models with production (see Miao (2014) for
a survey). This literature does not resolve the coexistence puzzle, i.e., why bubbles like fiat
money can coexist with interest-bearing assets. In our model the intrinsically useless lemons can
coexist with good assets with positive payoffs in a pooling equilibrium due to adverse selection.
This is related to some recent papers in the search and monetary economics literature (see,
e.g., Williamson and Wright (1994), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012), Li, Rocheteau,
and Weill (2012), and the survey by Lagos, Rocheteau, and Wright (2015)).
2 The Model
Consider a discrete-time infinite-horizon model based on Kiyotaki and Moore (2008). The
economy is populated by a continuum of identical workers with a unit measure and a continuum
of ex ante identical entrepreneurs with a unit measure. Each entrepreneur runs a firm that
is subject to idiosyncratic shocks to its investment efficiency, so entrepreneurs are ex post
heterogeneous. There is no aggregate uncertainty about fundamentals. Assume that a law of
large numbers holds so that aggregate variables are deterministic.
2.1 Setup
Each worker supplies one unit of labor inelastically. For simplicity, we assume that workers
have no access to financial markets, and thus they simply consume their wage income in each
period. Entrepreneurs are risk neutral and indexed by j ∈ [0, 1]. Entrepreneur j derives utility
from a consumption stream {Cjt} according to
∞∑
t=0
βtCjt, Cjt ≥ 0, (1)
3Other related papers include Eisfeldt (2004), Tomura (2012), Gorton and Ordon˜ez (2014), Benhabib, Dong
and Wang (2014), Li and Whited (2014), and House and Masatlioglu (2015), among others.
6
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the common subjective discount factor. He owns a constant-returns-
to-scale technology to produce output according to
yjt = Ak
α
jtn
1−α
jt , α ∈ (0, 1) , (2)
where A, kjt, and njt represent productivity, capital input, and labor input, respectively.
Solving the static labor choice problem
Rktkjt ≡ max
njt≥0
Akαjtn
1−α
jt −Wtnjt
gives labor demand
njt =
[
(1− α)A
Wt
] 1
α
kjt, (3)
and the capital return
Rkt = αA
1
α
[
(1− α)
Wt
] 1−α
α
, (4)
where Wt is the wage rate.
Entrepreneur j can make investment ijt to raise his capital stock so that the law of motion
for his capital is given by
kjt+1 = (1− δ) kjt + ijtεjt, (5)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) represents the depreciation rate and εjt represents an investment efficiency
shock that is independent across firms and over time. Let the cumulative distribution function
of εjt be F on [εmin, εmax] ⊂ [0,∞). Assume that there is no insurance market against the
idiosyncratic investment shock εjt and that investment is irreversible at the firm level so that
ijt ≥ 0.
Entrepreneurs cannot trade physical capital due to its illiquidity, but can trade two types
of financial assets. First, they can borrow or save by trading a one-period risk-free bond with
zero net supply. Let Rft denote the market interest rate. Second, they can trade long-term
assets, which can be of high or low quality. The high quality asset, called the good asset,
delivers a positive payoff c in every period. One may interpret this asset as a console bond
with coupon payment c or land with rents c. The low quality asset, called lemon, does not
deliver any payoff. It may represent a toxic asset or useless land. The proportion of lemons in
the economy is pi. Assume that sellers know the quality of their own assets, but buyers cannot
distinguish between the lemons and the good assets. Moreover, no one who owned an asset
previously remembers it. This assumption is similar to that in Guerrieri and Shimer (2014)
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and simplifies the analysis. Due to this information asymmetry, assets are sold at the same
price Pt.
Entrepreneur j’s budget constraint is given by
Cjt + ijt +
bjt+1
Rft
= Rktkjt + Pt
(
sgjt + s
l
jt − xjt
)
+ chgjt + bjt, (6)
where sgjt ≥ 0, sljt ≥ 0, hgjt ≥ 0, xjt ≥ 0, and bjt represent the sale of the good asset, the
sale of the lemon, the holdings of the good asset, the total purchase of the two assets, and the
bond holdings respectively. When bjt < (≥) 0, it is interpreted as borrowing (saving). Assume
that entrepreneurs are borrowing constrained. There are many different ways to introduce
borrowing constraints in the literature. We adopt the following:
bjt+1
Rft
≥ −µtkjt, (7)
where µt ∈ [0, 1] . The interpretation is that entrepreneur j can use a fraction of his physical
capital as collateral to borrow from other firms (Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). We allow µt to
be time varying to capture the credit market condition. We interpret an increase in µt as an
exogenous credit boom by relaxing credit constraints.
Because buyers do not observe the quality of the assets, their purchased assets may contain
both lemons and good assets. Let Θt denote the fraction of good assets in the market. Then
the laws of motion for the holdings of the good asset and the lemon are given by
hgjt+1 = h
g
jt − sgjt + Θtxjt, (8)
hljt+1 = h
l
jt − sljt + (1−Θt)xjt. (9)
Entrepreneur j’s problem is to choose a nonnegative sequence of
{
ijt, s
g
jt, s
l
jt, xjt, Cjt
}
to
maximize his utility in (1) subject to (5), (6), (7), (8), (9) and the short-sales constraints
0 ≤ sgjt ≤ hgjt, 0 ≤ sljt ≤ hljt. (10)
2.2 Equilibrium Definition
Let Kt =
∫
kjtdi, It =
∫
ijtdj, Ct =
∫
Cjtdj, and Yt =
∫
yjtdj. A competitive equilibrium
under asymmetric information consists of sequences of aggregate quantities {Ct,Kt, It, Yt} ,
individual quantities
{
Cjt, ijt, s
g
jt, s
l
jt, xjt, bjt
}
, j ∈ [0, 1] , prices {Wt, Pt, Rkt, Rft} , and the
market proportion of good assets {Θt} such that:
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(i) The sequences
{
Cjt, ijt, s
g
jt, s
l
jt, xjt, bjt
}
solve each entrepreneur j’s optimization prob-
lem taking {Wt, Pt, Rkt, Rft} and {Θt} as given.
(ii) The sequences {njt, Rkt} satisfy (3) and (22).
(iii) All markets clear,∫
xjtdj =
∫ (
sgjt + s
l
jt
)
dj, (11)∫
hljtdj = pi,
∫
hgjtdj = 1− pi,
∫
bjtdj = 0, (12)∫
njtdj = 1, Wt + Ct + It = Yt + (1− pi) c. (13)
(iv) The law of motion for aggregate capital satisfies
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
∫
εjtijtdj. (14)
(v) The market proportion of good assets is consistent with individual entrepreneurs’ selling
decisions,
Θt =
∫
sgjtdj∫
sljtdj +
∫
sgjtdj
. (15)
3 Symmetric Information Benchmark
Before deriving solutions to our model with information asymmetry, we first consider a bench-
mark with symmetric information. Suppose that both the buyers and sellers know the quality of
the long-term assets so that there are separate prices P gt and P
l
t associated with the good asset
and the lemon respectively. Moreover, buyers can purchase the lemon or the good asset sepa-
rately. In this case entrepreneur j’s decision problem is to choose
{
Cjt, ijt, s
g
jt, s
l
jt, x
g
jt, x
l
jt, bjt
}
to maximize (1) subject to (5), (10), and
Cjt + ijt +
bjt+1
Rft
= Rktkjt + P
g
t
(
sgjt − xgjt
)
+ P lt
(
sljt − xljt
)
+ chgjt + bjt,
hgjt+1 = h
g
jt − sgjt + xgjt,
hljt+1 = h
l
jt − sljt + xljt,
kjt+1 = (1− δ) kjt + εjtijt,
bjt+1
Rft
≥ −µtkjt,
0 ≤ sgjt ≤ hgjt, 0 ≤ sljt ≤ hljt, Cjt, kjt, ijt ≥ 0,
where xgjt and x
l
jt represent the purchase of the good asset and the lemon asset respectively.
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A competitive equilibrium under symmetric information consists of sequences of aggregate
quantities {Ct,Kt, It, Yt} , individual quantities
{
Cjt, ijt, s
g
jt, s
l
jt, x
g
jt, x
l
jt, bjt
}
, j ∈ [0, 1] , and
prices
{
Wt, Rkt, Rft, P
g
t , P
l
t
}
such that:
(i) The sequences
{
Cjt, ijt, s
g
jt, s
l
jt, x
g
jt, x
l
jt, bjt
}
solve each entrepreneur j’s optimization
problem taking
{
Wt, Rkt, P
g
t , P
l
t
}
as given.
(ii) The sequences {njt, Rkt} satisfy (3) and (22).
(iii) All markets clear so that equations∫
xgjtdj =
∫
sgjtdj,
∫
xljtdj =
∫
sljtdj,
(12), and (13) hold.
(iv) The law of motion for aggregate capital satisfies (14).
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium system under symmetric informa-
tion.
Proposition 1 In a competitive equilibrium with symmetric information, let
ε∗t =
1
Qt
∈ (εmin, εmax) .
Then:
1. Firms with εjt ≥ ε∗t make real investment, sell all of their good assets and lemons, and
exhaust their borrowing limit.
2. Firms with εjt < ε
∗
t do not invest. They are willing to buy any amount of good assets and
lemons and are indifferent between borrowing and saving.
3.
(
Qt, P
g
t , P
l
t , Rkt, Rft,Kt, It
)
satisfy
Qt = β
{
(1− δ)Qt+1 +Rkt+1 + (Rkt+1 + µt+1)
∫ εmax
ε∗t+1
(
ε
ε∗t+1
− 1
)
dF (ε)
}
, (16)
P gt =
P gt+1 + c
Rft
, (17)
P lt =
P lt+1
Rft
, (18)
1
Rft
= β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗t+1
(
ε
ε∗t+1
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
, (19)
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Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt +
[
RktKt + piP
l
t + (1− pi) (P gt + c) + µtKt
] ∫ εmax
ε∗t
εdF (ε), (20)
It =
[
RktKt + (1− pi) (P gt + c) + piP lt + µtKt
]
[1− F (ε∗t )] , (21)
Rkt = αAK
α−1
t , (22)
and the usual transversality conditions.
Here Qt represents Tobin’s marginal Q or the shadow price of capital. Equation (16) is
the asset pricing equation for capital. Each firm j makes real investment if and only if its
investment efficiency shock εjt exceeds an investment threshold ε
∗
t = 1/Qt. That is, the firm’s
marginal Q exceeds the investment cost 1/εjt in terms of consumption units. Equations (17)
and (18) are the asset pricing equations for the good asset and the lemon respectively. The
lemon represents a pure bubble asset because it does not deliver any fundamental payoffs.
If agents believe it will not have value in the future, P lt+1 = 0, then it has no value today
P lt = 0. Equation (19) is the asset pricing equation for the bond. In our deterministic model
the discount rates for the good asset and the lemon are the same and equal to the interest
rate Rft. The interest rate is determined by the condition that the marginal entrepreneur is
indifferent between consuming today and investing tomorrow. This condition also holds for the
model with information asymmetry studied in Section 4.
The integral term in (16) and (19) represents the liquidity premium because capital and
bonds can help the firm relax its borrowing constraints by raising its net worth. We focus on
the interpretation of (19). Purchasing a unit of bonds costs 1/Rft at time t. At time t + 1,
when the investment efficiency shock εjt+1 ≥ ε∗t+1 = 1/Qt+1, firm j receives one unit of the
payoff from the bond and then uses this payoff to finance real investment, which generates
profits εjt+1Qt+1− 1. The average profits are given by the integral term, which also represents
the option value of investment in the next period. Equation (19) shows that in equilibrium the
marginal cost must be equal to the marginal benefit. Equations (20) and (21) give the law of
motion for capital and aggregate investment. They reflect the fact that firms can use internal
funds, short-term debt, and long-term assets to finance real investment.
If there were no good asset in the model, then a lemon bubble could emerge and the bubble
and bonds could coexist (Miao, Wang, and Zhou (2015)). In this case the lemon and the bond
are perfect substitutes and the net interest rate on bonds must be zero (Rf = 1) in the steady
state. However, in the presence of an asset with positive payoffs, a lemon bubble cannot exist.
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To see this we study the steady state and use a variable without a subscript to denote its steady
state value. We maintain the following assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 Let
β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
εmin
(
ε
εmin
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
> 1. (23)
This assumption states that the marginal benefit from one unit of liquidity when an en-
trepreneur invests for all efficiency levels is larger than one. It is equivalent to βE (ε) > εmin,
which is a weak restriction. In particular, it is satisfied when β is sufficiently close to 1. The
following lemma will be repeatedly used.
Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique solution, denoted by ε∗b , to ε
∗ ∈ (εmin, εmax)
in the equation
β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
= 1. (24)
This lemma states that there is an interior investment cutoff ε∗b such that the marginal
benefit from one unit of liquidity is exactly equal to one in the steady state. At this cutoff the
steady-state interest rate is equal to one. The following proposition characterizes the steady-
state equilibrium of the economy under symmetric information.
Proposition 2 Let assumption 1 hold. When µ is sufficiently small, there exists a unique
steady state equilibrium in which P l = 0,
Rf = Rf (ε
∗) ≡ 1
β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
] > 1, (25)
P g =
c
Rf (ε∗)− 1 , (26)
K = K (ε∗) ≡

(
1
β − 1 + δ
)
1
ε∗ −
[∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
]
µ
αA
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
]

1
α−1
, (27)
where ε∗ ∈ (ε∗b , εmax) is the unique solution to the equation
D (ε∗) ≡ δK (ε
∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗)α − µK (ε∗)− (1− pi) c = (1− pi) c
Rf (ε∗)− 1 . (28)
Moreover, ∂ε
∗
∂µ > 0,
∂K
∂µ > 0,
∂Y
∂µ > 0,
∂Rf
∂µ > 0, and
∂P g
∂µ < 0.
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Equation (26) shows that the price of the good asset is equal to the discounted present
value of dividends and the discount rate is the interest rate. Since ε∗ > ε∗b , the interest rate
Rf (ε
∗) > 1. Equation (27) gives the steady-state capital stock and is derived from equation (16)
using ε∗ = 1/Q. Since we will show later that (16) also holds under asymmetric information,
the steady-state capital stock has the same functional form K (·) . The expression on the left-
hand side of (28) represents the aggregate demand D (ε∗) for outside liquidity from the market
for long-term assets and the expression on the right-hand side represents the aggregate supply
S (ε∗) of such outside liquidity. The demand comes from the investment spending net of internal
profits, short-term debt backed by collateralized capital, and dividends from the good asset.
The supply comes from the sale of the good asset. The existence of an equilibrium ε∗ can
be easily proved using equation (28) by the intermediate value theorem. For uniqueness we
impose a sufficient condition that µ is sufficiently small so that the demand for and the supply
of outside liquidity are monotonic in ε∗. For all our numerical examples studied later, we choose
values of µ to ensure uniqueness.
Under symmetric information the good asset drives the bad. If the two types of assets
coexisted in the steady state in the sense that P l > 0 and P g > 0, equations (17) and (18)
would imply that
P g + c
P g
= Rf , 1 = Rf .
These two equations cannot hold at the same time whenever c > 0. This means that the lemon
must have no value in the steady state, P l = 0. Anticipating zero price in the long run, the
market would not value the lemon at any time; that is, P lt = 0 for all t by equation (18) (see
Miao, Wang, and Zhou (2014) for a formal proof). This result illustrates the coexistence puzzle
in the literature on rational bubbles and in monetary theory.
We can measure market liquidity in two ways. First, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
measure market liquidity as the difference between the market price and the fundamental value.
Although the fundamental value has various different meanings in the literature, they define
it as the asset value in an economy without frictions. According to their definition, market
liquidity is given by P gt − βc1−β . Since the fundamental value is constant, we can simply use the
market price as a proxy for market liquidity. Second, we can use trading volume to measure
market liquidity. Since only the good asset is traded when εjt > ε
∗
t , trading volume is given by
(1− pi) [1− F (ε∗t )] . We can show that these two measures are positively correlated.
Turning to a comparative statics analysis in the steady state, we consider the impact of an
increase in µ, which can be interpreted as a permanent credit boom. Proposition 2 shows that a
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Figure 1: Transition dynamics in response to a permanent credit shock under symmetric infor-
mation when µt rises from 0.001 to 0.0165 from period 1 onward. The vertical axes for variables
other than ε∗t and µt describe percentage changes.
permanent credit boom raises the interest rate and drives down market liquidity. Even though
funding liquidity erodes market liquidity, total liquidity will rise. This improves investment
efficiency and alleviates resource misallocation by raising ε∗, leading to increased output and
investment.
We close this section by analyzing the transition dynamics of an unexpected permanent
credit boom using a numerical example.4 We do not intend to match data quantitatively
and set parameter values as follows: β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, and
c = 0.06. We also set F as the uniform distribution over [0, 1] . As shown in Figure 1, a credit
boom through an increase in µt improves investment efficiency by raising ε
∗
t , which lowers
the liquidity premium, and therefore the market liquidity (P gt ) decreases. Meanwhile, since
people have rational expectations about the unique steady state in which P l = 0, there is no
belief supporting a positive sequence for P lt in the transition dynamics. Moreover, the credit
expansion drives up the total liquidity, which boosts investment, output and consumption in
4We use Dynare to compute all numerical examples in the paper based on the nonlinear shooting algorithm
for solving deterministic dynamic models described in Adjemian et al (2011).
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the long run. Consumption drops initially because investment jumps on impact, but total
output does not change as it is determined by predetermined capital only.
4 Asymmetric Information
When there is information asymmetry, three types of equilibrium (pooling equilibrium, bubbly
lemon equilibrium, and frozen equilibrium) can arise. We will first study an entrepreneur’s
decision problem and then study these equilibria.
4.1 Decision Problem
Suppose that lemons and good assets are traded at the pooling price Pt > 0. Entrepreneurs
take sequences of prices {Wt, Pt, Rft} and the market proportion of good assets {Θt} as given.
The following proposition characterizes their decision problems.
Proposition 3 Under asymmetric information, in a competitive equilibrium with Pt > 0 for
all t, let
ε∗t =
1
Qt
∈ (εmin, εmax) , ε∗∗t = min
{
pgt ε
∗
t
Pt
, εmax
}
> ε∗t ,
where
{
Qt, p
g
t , p
l
t, Pt, Rft
}
satisfy equations (16), (19), and
pgt =
c
Rft
+ βpgt+1
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗∗t+1
(
ε
ε∗∗t+1
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
, (29)
plt =
Pt+1
Rft
, (30)
Pt = Θtp
g
t + (1−Θt)plt. (31)
1. If εjt ≥ ε∗t , firm j exhausts its borrowing limit to make investment, sells all its lemons
(sljt = h
l
jt), and does not buy any asset. It sells all its good assets (s
g
jt = h
g
jt) if εjt ≥ ε∗∗t ,
but does not sell any good assets (sgjt = 0) if ε
∗
t ≤ εjt < ε∗∗t .
2. If εjt < ε
∗
t , firm j does not invest, does not sell any good assets (s
g
jt = 0), sells all its
lemons, is willing to purchase any amount of assets, and is indifferent between saving and
borrowing.
3. The optimal investment rule is given by
ijt =
{
Rktkjt + Pt
(
sgjt + h
l
jt
)
+ chgjt + µtkjt + bjt if εjt ≥ ε∗t
0 otherwise
.
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Unlike in the symmetric information case, pgt and p
l
t are shadow prices of the good asset
and the lemon asset respectively, which represent the holding value of the assets. They must
satisfy equilibrium restrictions (29) and (30). Both assets are traded at the common market
price Pt, which is a weighted average of p
l
t and p
g
t .
The cutoff value ε∗t = 1/Qt is the investment threshold as in the symmetric information
case. Unlike in the symmetric information case, information asymmetry induces firms to sell
all of their lemons for any level of efficiency shocks εjt. The reason is that the market price Pt
is at least as high as the shadow price plt of the lemon. Equation (30) shows that p
l
t is equal to
the future selling price Pt+1 discounted by the interest rate Rft.
Because Pt is also not higher than the shadow price p
g
t of the good asset, firms will not sell
the good asset unless there are other benefits from selling in addition to the price. The extra
benefits come from profits generated by funded additional real investment. The total benefits
are given by QtεtPt = Ptεt/ε
∗
t . When these benefits exceed the shadow price p
g
t , the firm will
sell the good asset. This gives the second cutoff ε∗∗t given in the proposition. The right-hand
side of (29) reflects dividends c and the total benefit from selling the good asset in the next
period. Note that it is possible that pgt ε
∗
t /Pt ≥ εmax or ε∗∗t = εmax. In this case no firm will sell
any good asset so that no good asset will be traded in the market. We will analyze this case
in the next subsection.
Next we analyze an entrepreneur’s decision problem when the market for long-term assets
breaks down. In this case firms can use internal funds, short-term debt, and payoffs from the
good asset to finance real investment. Since long-term financial assets are not traded in a frozen
equilibrium, hgjt = h
g
j0 for all t.
Proposition 4 In a competitive equilibrium in which the market for long-term assets breaks
down, let
ε∗t =
1
Qt
∈ (εmin, εmax) ,
where Qt satisfies (16). Then the optimal investment rule is given by
ijt =
{
Rktkjt + ch
g
jt + µtkjt + bjt if εjt ≥ ε∗t
0 otherwise
.
4.2 Bubbly Lemon Equilibrium
Now we impose the market-clearing conditions and derive the equilibrium system when only
lemons are traded in the market. This happens when ε∗∗t = εmax and hence Θt = 0 and Pt = plt.
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Proposition 5 The dynamical system for a bubbly lemon equilibrium is given by eight equa-
tions (16), (19), (22), ε∗t = 1/Qt, and
Pt =
Pt+1
Rft
, (32)
pgt = βp
g
t+1 +
c
Rft
, (33)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + [RktKt + piPt + (1− pi) c+ µtKt]
∫ εmax
ε∗t
εdF (ε) , (34)
It = [RktKt + piPt + (1− pi) c+ µtKt] [1− F (ε∗t )] , (35)
for eight variables {Qt, pgt , Pt, Rkt, Rft,Kt, It, ε∗t } satisfying the restrictions
0 < Pt ≤ ε
∗
t
εmax
pgt , εmin < ε
∗
t < εmax. (36)
Once we know the eight equilibrium variables {Qt, pgt , Pt, Rkt, Rft,Kt, It, ε∗t } , we can derive
other equilibrium variables easily. Here pgt denotes the shadow price of the good asset and Pt
is the market price of the lemon. When PtQtεmax = Ptεmax/ε
∗
t ≤ pgt , it is not profitable even
for the most efficient firm to sell the good asset to finance real investment. Thus the good
asset is not traded in the market. Why can the intrinsically useless lemon asset be traded at a
positive price? The reason is that firms with high investment efficiency want to sell this asset
at a positive price to finance investment. Firms with low investment efficiency want to buy
this asset because they believe that they can sell lemons at a positive price to finance future
investment if a high investment efficiency shock arrives in the future.
To derive the existence of such an equilibrium, we first analyze the steady state. Define
cH ≡ δK (ε
∗
b)∫ εmax
ε∗b
εdF (ε)
− αA [K (ε∗b)]α − µK (ε∗b) , cL ≡
cH (1− β) εmax
ε∗b
, (37)
cB (pi) ≡ cHcL
picH + (1− pi)cL , c¯
B (pi) ≡ cH
1− pi , (38)
where ε∗b is defined in Lemma 1 and K (·) is defined in (27). Note that cB (pi) and c¯B (pi) also
depend on other parameters in the model, especially µ.
Proposition 6 Let assumption 1 hold. If
0 < cB (pi) ≤ c ≤ c¯B (pi) , (39)
then there exists a unique steady-state equilibrium with bubbly lemons in which the investment
threshold is ε∗b ∈ (εmin, εmax), the aggregate capital stock is K (ε∗b), the interest rate Rf = 1, the
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shadow price of the good asset is given by
pg =
c
1− β , (40)
and the market price of the lemon P satisfies
δK (ε∗b)∫ εmax
ε∗b
εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗b)α − µK (ε∗b)− (1− pi) c = piP. (41)
The intuition for condition (39) is as follows. If 0 < c < cB (pi) , then the fundamentals
of the good asset are too weak so that its shadow price (or holding value) is too low. Thus
it is more profitable for firms with sufficiently high investment shocks to sell the good asset
to finance real investment. This means that the good asset will be traded in the market and
the bubbly lemon equilibrium cannot exist. On the other hand, if c > c¯B (pi) , then firms can
use the payoffs c from the good asset to finance real investment, and there is no room for the
emergence of a lemon bubble to finance real investment.
Since the lemon asset does not have any payoff, the interest rate in the bubbly lemon steady
state must be exactly equal to one by (32). In this case the investment cutoff is equal to ε∗b
derived in Lemma 1. Equation (40) states that the shadow price of the good asset is equal to
the present value of dividends discounted by the subjective discount factor β. Equation (41)
states that the demand for outside liquidity from the market for long-term assets is equal to
the liquidity provided by the lemon asset only because the good asset is not traded.
Consider the impact of the parameter pi, holding c as well as other parameters constant.
If the proportion pi of lemons is too low, then the price of the financial assets will be high
enough for firms with high investment efficiency to sell their good assets to finance their real
investment. Thus a bubbly lemon equilibrium cannot exist and a pooling equilibrium may
arise.
Figure 2 illustrates the region of the parameters for the existence of a bubbly lemon equi-
librium. We can easily show that c¯B (pi) is an increasing function of pi on [0, 1] and c¯B (0) = cH
and limpi→1 c¯B (pi) = ∞. But cB (pi) is a decreasing function of pi on [0, 1] and cB (0) = cH
and limpi→1 cB (pi) = cL. In addition, c¯B (pi) > cB (pi) for pi ∈ (0, 1]. A unique bubbly lemon
equilibrium exists for parameter values of (pi, c) in the region between the lines c = c¯B (pi) and
c = cB (pi) .
4.3 Pooling Equilibrium
The following proposition characterizes a pooling equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Three types of equilibrium.
Proposition 7 The dynamical system for a pooling equilibrium is given by 11 equations (16),
(19), (22), (29), (30), (31),
ε∗t =
1
Qt
, ε∗∗t =
pgt
Pt
ε∗t ,
Θt =
(1− pi) [1− F (ε∗∗t )]
pi + (1− pi) [1− F (ε∗∗t )]
, (42)
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt+(1− pi)Pt
∫ εmax
ε∗∗t
εdF (ε)+[RktKt + piPt + (1− pi) c+ µtKt]
∫ εmax
ε∗t
εdF (ε) ,
(43)
It = [RktKt + piPt + (1− pi) c+ µtKt] [1− F (ε∗t )] + (1− pi)Pt [1− F (ε∗∗t )] , (44)
for 11 variables
{
Qt, p
g
t , p
l
t, Pt, Rkt, Rft,Θt,Kt, It, ε
∗
t , ε
∗∗
t
}
satisfying the restrictions
εmin < ε
∗
t < ε
∗∗
t < εmax. (45)
In a pooling equilibrium both the good asset and the lemon are traded at the pooling price
Pt to finance real investment. There is an interior threshold ε
∗∗
t for selling the good asset.
Thus the proportion of good assets in the market is given by (42). Equation (44) reveals that
aggregate investment is financed by internal funds, the lemon, and the good asset.
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We now analyze the steady state of a pooling equilibrium. We will first prove the existence
of the two steady state thresholds ε∗ and ε∗∗. By (29), the steady-state shadow price of the
good asset is given by
pg (ε∗, ε∗∗) ≡ β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
)
1− β (1 + ∫ εmaxε∗∗ ( εε∗∗ − 1) dF (ε))c. (46)
By the definition of ε∗ and ε∗∗, the pooling price is given by
P (ε∗, ε∗∗) =
ε∗
ε∗∗
pg (ε∗, ε∗∗) . (47)
Equation (30) in the steady state gives
pl (ε∗, ε∗∗) = β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
P (ε∗, ε∗∗) . (48)
Equation (31) in the steady state implies that
P (ε∗, ε∗∗) = Θ (ε∗∗) pg (ε∗, ε∗∗) + (1−Θ (ε∗∗))pl (ε∗, ε∗∗) , (49)
where it follows from (42) that
Θ (ε∗∗) =
(1− pi) [1− F (ε∗∗)]
pi + (1− pi) [1− F (ε∗∗)] .
Equations (47), (48), and (49) imply that
1 = Θ (ε∗∗)
ε∗∗
ε∗
+ (1−Θ (ε∗∗))β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
. (50)
Lemma 2 Let assumption 1 hold. For any ε∗∗ ∈ (ε∗b , εmax), there exists a unique solution,
denoted by ε∗ = Φ (ε∗∗) , to ε∗ ∈ (ε∗b , ε∗∗) in equation (50).
Figure 3 illustrates the function Φ. It is not a monotonic function on (ε∗b , εmax) and satisfies
the property that
lim
ε∗∗↓ε∗b
Φ (ε∗∗) = ε∗b = lim
ε∗∗↑εmax
Φ (ε∗∗) .
Now we prove the existence of ε∗∗ using a single equation. To derive this equation, we first
rewrite equation (43) in the steady state as
D (ε∗) = S (ε∗, ε∗∗) ≡
∫ εmax
ε∗∗ εdF (ε)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
(1− pi)P (ε∗, ε∗∗) + piP (ε∗, ε∗∗) , (51)
where D (ε∗) represents the demand for outside liquidity defined in Section 3 and S (ε∗, ε∗∗)
represents the supply of outside liquidity. The supply comes from the sale of the good asset
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Figure 3: A numerical illustration of ε∗ = Φ (ε∗∗) . We set β = 0.97 and F (ε) = ε for ε ∈ [0, 1].
and the lemon. The lemon is always sold at the price P (ε∗, ε∗∗) , but the good asset is sold
only when ε ≥ ε∗∗.
Substituting ε∗ = Φ (ε∗∗) into (51) and (47) yields an equation for ε∗∗,
D (Φ (ε∗∗)) = S (Φ (ε∗∗) , ε∗∗) .
We can also rewrite this equation as
Γ (ε∗∗;pi) = c, (52)
where
Γ (ε∗∗;pi) ≡
δK(Φ(ε∗∗))∫ εmax
Φ(ε∗∗) εdF (ε)
− αA [K (Φ (ε∗∗, pi))]α − µK (Φ (ε∗∗))
(1− pi) + Φ(ε∗∗)ε∗∗
[
pi + (1− pi)
∫ εmax
ε∗∗ εdF (ε)∫ εmax
Φ(ε∗∗) εdF (ε)
][
β
(
1+
∫ εmax
Φ(ε∗∗)
(
ε
Φ(ε∗∗,pi)−1
)
dF (ε)
)
1−β(1+
∫ εmax
ε∗∗ (
ε
ε∗∗−1)dF (ε))
] . (53)
Proposition 8 Let assumption 1 hold and cH > 0 where cH is given in (37). For a sufficiently
small µ and any pi ∈ (0, 1), there exists a solution, denoted by ε∗∗p , to ε∗∗ ∈ (ε∗b , εmax) in equation
(52) if and only if 0 < c < cP (pi), where
cP (pi) = max
ε∗∗∈[ε∗b ,εmax]
Γ (ε∗∗;pi) . (54)
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Figure 4: A numerical illustration of Γ (ε∗∗;pi) . We set β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15,
pi = 0.25, and F (ε) = ε on [0, 1] .
In this case a pooling steady state equilibrium exists and the steady-state capital stock is given
by K
(
ε∗p
)
, where ε∗p = Φ
(
ε∗∗p
)
.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. If c is close to zero, then the good asset
is similar to the lemon and buyers cannot distinguish between these two types of assets. Thus
both types of assets can be traded at a pooling price in equilibrium. But if c exceeds cP (pi) ,
then the fundamentals of the good asset are too strong. Holders of the good asset will not
want to sell it and the good asset will not be traded in the market. Thus a pooling equilibrium
cannot exist and a bubbly lemon equilibrium may arise.
Figure 4 illustrates the function Γ and the determination of the equilibrium threshold ε∗∗.
We can show that
lim
ε∗∗↓ε∗b
Γ (ε∗∗;pi) = 0, lim
ε∗∗↑εmax
Γ (ε∗∗;pi) = cB (pi) . (55)
The function Γ (ε∗∗;pi) may not be monotonic in ε∗∗. There may be multiple solutions for ε∗∗
and hence there may exist multiple pooling equilibria, each of which corresponds to a solution
for ε∗∗.
Figure 2 illustrates the existence condition in the parameter space of (pi, c). When pi → 1,
we must have Θ→ 0, ε∗ → ε∗b , and ε∗∗ → εmax. Thus Γ (ε∗∗;pi)→ cH so that cP (1) = cH . On
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the other hand, when pi → 0, we must have Θ→ 1 so that ε∗ = ε∗∗. Then Γ (ε∗∗;pi) reaches the
maximum of infinity when ε∗∗ = ε∗b . It follows from (54) that c
P (0) =∞. A pooling equilibrium
exists for parameter values of (pi, c) in the region below the line c = cP (pi) . The function cP (pi)
is downward sloping. Holding c as well as other parameters constant, if the proportion pi of
lemons is too high, then the adverse selection problem will be so severe that trading the good
asset as a way to subsidize the lemon would be highly discouraged. Thus a pooling equilibrium
cannot exist.
4.4 Frozen Equilibrium
We finally analyze the frozen equilibrium in which agents expect the asset price to be zero. Then
no sellers will want to sell their assets at a zero price and no assets will be traded. The market
for long-term assets will completely break down. The following proposition characterizes the
equilibrium system.
Proposition 9 The dynamical system for a frozen equilibrium is given by five equations (16),
(22), ε∗t = 1/Qt, and
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + [RktKt + (1− pi) c+ µtKt]
∫ εmax
ε∗t
εdF (ε), (56)
It = [RktKt + (1− pi) c+ µtKt] [1− F (ε∗t )] , (57)
for five variables {Qt, Rkt,Kt, It, ε∗t } satisfying the restriction ε∗t ∈ (εmin, εmax) .
The following proposition characterizes the steady state.
Proposition 10 There exists a unique steady state for the frozen equilibrium in which the
steady-state capital stock is equal to K (ε∗a) defined in (27) where ε∗a ∈ (εmin, εmax) is the unique
solution to ε∗ ∈ (εmin, εmax) in the equation D (ε∗) = 0, i.e.,
δK (ε∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗)α − µK (ε∗)− (1− pi) c = 0. (58)
Equation (58) shows that the supply of outside liquidity from the market for long-term
assets is zero.
5 Steady-State Properties
We now combine the previous analyses and present the parameter space of (pi, c) for the exis-
tence of the three types of equilibrium using Figure 2. First, we note that a frozen equilibrium
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always exists on the whole parameter space. Next, by (54) and (55), we have cB (pi) ≤ cP (pi) .
Thus the curve c = cP (pi) is always above the curve c = cB (pi) . We highlight two impor-
tant regions. We can see that a bubbly lemon equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium coexist
when (pi, c) lies in the region
{
(pi, c) |cB (pi) ≤ c ≤ min (cB (pi) , cP (pi))}. But in the region{
(pi, c) |cP (pi) ≤ c ≤ cB (pi)} , the bad asset drives out the good one in the sense that a bubbly
lemon equilibrium exists but a pooling equilibrium does not.
Proposition 11 Let assumption 1 hold. Suppose that the parameter values are such that the
three types of equilibrium under asymmetric information coexist. Then
K (ε∗a) < K (ε
∗
b) < K
(
ε∗p
)
,
where ε∗a, ε∗b , and ε
∗
p denote the investment thresholds in the frozen equilibrium, bubbly lemon
equilibrium, and pooling equilibrium, respectively.
The intuition behind Proposition 11 is the following. As characterized previously, the
demand side for outside liquidity from the market for long-term assets is the same for all types
of equilibria. What differs is the supply side. The liquidity supplied in a pooling equilibrium
is larger than that supplied in a bubbly lemon equilibrium, which in turn is larger than that
supplied in a frozen equilibrium. Thus the steady-state capital stock is the largest in a pooling
equilibrium and the smallest in a frozen equilibrium.
We have so far characterized the steady states and their existence conditions. We now use
some numerical examples to illustrate the impact of a permanent credit boom on the steady
states. We illustrate the effect of µ on asset prices and output in Figure 5. For the parameter
values given in Section 3, all three types of steady state equilibria coexist for µ ∈ [0, 0.016] .
There are two steady-state pooling equilibria. We will focus on the ‘good’ pooling steady
state with a higher asset price and larger output because this steady state is stable (a saddle
point) and the other is unstable. When µ rises, funding liquidity rises and imposes a negative
externality on the market for the long-term asset. The asset price and market liquidity decline.
The total liquidity (sum of market liquidity and funding liquidity) may not be monotonic with
µ and hence real investment and output are not monotonic either. There may exist an optimal
level of µ that strikes a balance between funding and market liquidity. As illustrated on the
right panel of Figure 5, the effect of µ on asset prices and output is indeed non-monotone and
output is maximized at µ = 0.009.
24
0 0.005 0.01 0.015
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
A
ss
et
P
ri
ce
(
)

 
 
Pooling G
Pooling B
Bubbly Lemon
0 0.005 0.01 0.015
3.2
3.22
3.24
3.26
3.28
3.3
3.32
3.34
3.36

O
ut
pu
t
(
)
Figure 5: The impact of µ on the steady state asset price and output. We set β = 0.97,
α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, c = 0.06, and F (ε) = ε on [0, 1] .
When µ ∈ [0.016, 0.017] , funding liquidity is so large that entrepreneurs have no incen-
tive to trade good assets because good assets must subsidize lemons due to adverse selection.
Entrepreneurs are willing to trade lemons as a bubble because the bubble can raise their net
worth and help them finance investment. In this case only the bubbly lemon steady state exists.
Asset prices and output are discontinuous at µ = 0.016. A small change of µ near µ = 0.016
can cause an equilibrium regime shift and hence liquidity can be fragile.
When µ > 0.017, entrepreneurs not only have no incentive to sell their good assets, but
also have no interest in trading lemons because they have sufficient funding liquidity to finance
investment and there is no need to trade lemons as a bubble asset. In this case neither the
pooling steady state nor the bubbly lemon steady state can be supported and the market for
long-term assets breaks down.
6 Transition Dynamics
In this section we study transition dynamics when the economy moves from one steady state
to another. This transition can be caused by either shifts in beliefs or shocks to fundamentals.
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Figure 6: Belief-driven regime shift from the good pooling steady state to the bubbly lemon
steady state. We set β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, c = 0.06, and F (ε) = ε on
[0, 1] .
Although financial markets are typically disrupted in recessions with trading volume and asset
prices plummeting, seldom do we observe a complete market collapse. Therefore we focus on
pooling and bubbly lemon equilibria. Meanwhile, since the fluctuations of financial markets are
turbulent, and even seemingly discontinuous, there may exist regime switch from one type of
equilibrium to another. Thus our numerical examples proceed with the coexistence parameter
space defined in the previous section. We do not intend to match data, but use numerical
examples to illustrate the workings of the model.
6.1 Belief-Driven Regime Shifts
We first consider the case where a change in beliefs can cause a regime shift without any shock
to fundamentals. We set the parameter values as in Section 3 and also µ = 0.001. There are
two pooling steady states as shown in Figure 5. Suppose that the economy is initially at the
good pooling steady state at t = 1.
Suppose that agents pessimistically believe that the economy will suddenly shift to a bubbly
lemon equilibrium at t = 1. The change in beliefs is also unexpected. Figure 6 describes the
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transition dynamics from the pooling steady state to the bubbly lemon steady state. The
figure shows that the asset price drops discontinuously. Entrepreneurs do not trade good
assets but rather trade lemons only. Thus market liquidity declines. Real investment also
drops discontinuously initially and gradually rises to a lower bubbly lemon steady state level.
Output also drops gradually to a lower bubbly lemon steady state level. But consumption
counterfactually rises on impact by the resource constraint. This is because labor is exogenously
fixed and capital is predetermined. One way to fix this problem is to introduce variable labor
and capacity utilization so that output can fall on impact.
This example shows that a change in beliefs without any fundamental shock can cause a
liquidity dry-up and a recession. On the other hand, an optimistic belief shift can cause a boom
without any fundamental shock. Suppose that the economy is initially at the bubbly lemon
steady state. But people optimistically believe that the economy will switch to a pooling equi-
librium immediately. When an entrepreneur optimistically believes that other entrepreneurs
will trade their good assets, he is willing to do the same. Thus market liquidity increases and
the asset price rises. As more entrepreneurs are willing to sell their good assets, the average
asset quality in the market improves, which drives up the pooling price, and in turn justifies
the initial optimistic belief. The increased market liquidity then boosts investment, accelerates
capital accumulation, and eventually raises both output and consumption. The transitional
dynamics look like the paths in Figure 6 flipped at the horizontal axis.
6.2 Good or Bad Credit Booms
Now we study the impact of a change in fundamentals through a change in funding liquidity.
In particular, we consider the impact of a credit boom when µt rises. Agents have perfect
foresight about the path of µt. We will show that a credit boom can cause either a boom in
the real economy or a financial crisis depending on agents’ beliefs.
First, we consider the impact of an unexpected temporary credit boom when µt rises from
0.001 to 0.009 initially and lasts for 16 periods and then returns to the original level forever.
Suppose that the economy is initially at the good pooling steady state and agents fully anticipate
the change of µt. Figure 7 shows the transition dynamics. The solid lines describe the case
where there is no regime shift and the economy will return to the original pooling steady state
eventually.
The dashed lines describe the case where agents pessimistically believe that the economy
will unexpectedly shift to the bubbly lemon equilibrium. In this case the asset price drops
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Figure 7: The impact of a temporary credit boom. The solid lines describe the transition
dynamics from the good pooling steady state to the same steady state. The dashed lines
describe the transition dynamics from the good pooling steady state to the bubbly lemon
steady state. We set β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, c = 0.06, and F (ε) = ε on
[0, 1] .
discontinuously and gradually returns to a lower level in the bubbly lemon steady state. Real
investment also drops discontinuously, rebounds slightly, and drops again with µt. It then
gradually rises to its lower steady-state level. Output also eventually decreases to a lower
steady-state level, resulting in a crisis.
Second, we consider the impact of an unexpected permanent credit boom. Suppose that the
economy is initially at the pooling steady state. Figure 8 illustrates that a modest credit boom
can lead to a boom in the real economy while a large one can lead to an economic recession.
The solid lines in the figure show the transition dynamics from one good pooling steady state
to another pooling steady state along a pooling equilibrium path when µt rises immediately
from 0.001 to 0.009 and stays there forever. Even though funding liquidity reduces market
liquidity, the total liquidity rises so that investment and output also rise slightly.
When µt rises immediately from 0.001 to 0.0165, the credit boom is so large that the pooling
steady state cannot be supported, as shown in Figure 5. Then the economy transits to a bubbly
lemon steady state. The asset price and investment drop discontinuously on impact. During
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Figure 8: The impact of a permanent credit boom. The solid lines describe the transition
dynamics from the good pooling steady to another good pooling steady state. The dashed
lines describe the transition dynamics from the good pooling steady state to the bubbly lemon
steady state. We set β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, c = 0.06, and F (ε) = ε on
[0, 1] .
the transition path, asset prices, investment, and output fall, leading to a recession.
What happens if the economy is initially at the bubbly lemon steady state? Consider the
impact of an unexpected permanent modest credit boom when µt rises immediately from 0.001
to 0.009 and stays there forever. Suppose that the agents are optimistic and the economy
switches immediately from a bubbly lemon steady state equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium.
The solid lines in Figure 9 show that asset prices, investment, and output all rise, resulting in
an economic expansion.
By contrast, if the credit boom is too large (e.g., µt increases from 0.001 to 0.0165), then a
pooling steady state can no longer be supported. Therefore a large credit boom worsens market
liquidity by discouraging entrepreneurs from selling their good assets in the market, which in
turn has a negative effect on investment, output, and consumption. Note that, when µ = 0.0165,
the bubbly lemon equilibrium and the frozen equilibrium coexist. We only consider the former
equilibrium because trading volume is still positive in this case, albeit reduced significantly.
This is more realistic than the frozen equilibrium.
29
0 20 40
-100
-50
0
50
 (%)
0 20 40
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Θ
0 20 40
0
200
400
Trading Volume (%)
0 20 40
0
5
10
15
20
25
 (%)
0 20 40
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
∗
0 20 40
0.9
0.95
1
∗∗
0 20 40
-2
0
2
 (%)
0 20 40
0
1
2
3
4
 (%)
0 20 40
0
0.005
0.01
0.015
Credit Expansion ()
 
 
Modest
Intensive
Figure 9: The impact of a permanent credit boom. The solid lines describe the transition
dynamics from the bubbly lemon steady state to the good pooling steady state. The dashed
lines describe the transition dynamics from the bubbly lemon steady state from another bubbly
lemon steady state. We set β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, c = 0.06, and
F (ε) = ε on [0, 1] .
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Figure 10: Transition dynamics starting from the bubbly lemmon steady state in response to
a gradual credit boom. We set β = 0.97, α = 0.38, A = 1, δ = 0.15, pi = 0.25, c = 0.06, and
F (ε) = ε on [0, 1] .
Combining the insights from the previous numerical examples in Figures 6 and 9 yields
the richer dynamics in Figure 10 that are closer to the empirical evidence. Suppose that the
economy is initially at the bubbly lemon steady state with µ = 0.001. There is a modest
unexpected credit boom in that µt increases from 0.001 to 0.009 from t = 1 to t = 16 and
then there is another unexpected large credit boom where µt increases from 0.009 to 0.0165
from t = 17 on. As shown in Section 5, a pooling steady state equilibrium can be sustained
at a modest level of µt but a large level. Suppose that people are optimistic and hence the
economy immediately switches to a pooling equilibrium regime that lasts until t = 16. But
since a pooling steady state cannot be supported at µ = 0.0165, people’s optimistic beliefs
cannot be sustained either and the economy reverts to the bubbly lemon regime. This causes
asset prices and output to fall. In summary, Figure 10 shows that a credit boom is initially
associated with a boom in asset prices, market liquidity, investment and output, but they all
fall later on and a crisis follows.
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7 Conclusion
We have provided a macroeconomic model with adverse selection to study the interaction
between market liquidity and funding liquidity in a production economy. Our key idea is that
funding liquidity can erode market liquidity. High funding liquidity discourages firms from
selling their good long-term assets since these good assets have to subsidize lemons when there
is information asymmetry between sellers and buyers. This can cause a liquidity dry-up in
the market for long-term assets and even a market breakdown, resulting in a financial crisis.
We show that three types of equilibrium can coexist. Credit booms combined with changes in
beliefs can cause equilibrium regime shifts, leading to an economic crisis or expansion.
One limitation of our model is that it is stylized and cannot be confronted with data.
Moreover, we have not studied policy questions because of space limitation. An important
implication of our model is that economic booms and busts are not only driven by fundamentals
but also self-fulfilling beliefs. How to design policies to eliminate equilibrium multiplicity is
important for econmic stability. We leave this topic for future research.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 We first consider an entrepreneur’s decision problem. For ease of
notation, we suppress the subscript j. Let Vt
(
kt, εt, h
g
t , h
l
t, bt
)
denote the value function, where
we have suppressed the aggregate state variables. Then Vt satisfies the following Bellman
equation
Vt
(
kt, εt, h
g
t , h
l
t, bt
)
= maxCt + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
, (A.1)
subject to the constraints described in Section 3, where the conditional expectation is taken
with respect to εt+1. Conjecture that the value function Vt takes the following form:
Vt
(
kt, εt, h
g
t , h
l
t, bt
)
= qt(εt)kt + φ
g
t (εt)h
g
t + φ
l
t(εt)h
l
t + φ
b
t (εt) bt, (A.2)
where qt(εt), φ
g
t (εt), φ
l
t(εt), and φ
b
t(εt) are to be determined.
Then Vt+1 is also linear and we can write
βEt
[
Vt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)]
= Qtkt+1 + p
g
th
g
t+1 + p
l
th
l
t+1 + p
b
tbt+1,
where we define
Qt = βE [qt+1(εt+1)] , p
g
t = βE
[
φgt+1(εt+1)
]
, (A.3)
plt = βE
[
φlt+1(εt+1)
]
, pbt = βE
[
φbt+1 (εt+1)
]
. (A.4)
We use the flow-of-funds constraint and other constraints in Section 3 to derive
Cjt + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
= Rktkt + P
g
t (s
g
t − xgt ) + P lt
(
slt − xlt
)
+ chgt + bt
−it − bt+1
Rft
+Qtkt+1 + p
g
th
g
t+1 + p
l
th
l
t+1 + p
b
tbt+1
= Rktkt − it + P gt (sgt − xgt ) + P lt
(
slt − xlt
)
+ chgt −
bt+1
Rft
+ bt
+Qt [(1− δ) kt + itεt] + pgt (hgt − sgt + xgt ) + plt
(
hlt − slt + xlt
)
+ pbtbt+1
= [Rkt + (1− δ)Qt] kt + (pgt + c)hgt + plthlt + bt +
(
pbt −
1
Rft
)
bt+1
+ (Qtεt − 1) it + (pgt − P gt )xgt +
(
plt − P lt
)
xlt + (P
g
t − pgt ) sgt +
(
P lt − plt
)
slt.
33
If pgt > P
g
t , then all entrepreneurs would purchase as much good assets as possible. If p
g
t < P
g
t ,
then no entrepreneurs would purchase any good asset. In both cases a competitive equilibrium
could not exist. Thus we must have pgt = P
g
t and p
l
t = P
l
t . If p
b
t > 1/Rft, then all entrepreneurs
would prefer to buy bonds and an equilibrium could not exist. If pbt < 1/Rft, then all en-
trepreneurs would borrow until the borrowing constraint binds. In this case all entrepreneurs
would also want to purchase as much financial assets as possible in order to take leverage. But
this would not constitute an equilibrium. Thus 1/Rft = p
b
t .
We can simplify the last equality to derive
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
= [Rkt + (1− δ)Qt] kt + (P gt + c)hgt + P lthlt + bt + (Qtεt − 1) it.
Let ε∗t = 1/Qt. Since it ≥ 0, it is optimal to make as much investment as possible if and only
if εt ≥ ε∗t .
By the flow-of-funds constraint and the borrowing constraint,
it = Rktkt + P
g
t (s
g
t − xgt ) + P lt
(
slt − xlt
)
+ chgt + bt − Ct −
bt+1
Rft
≤ Rktkt + P gt sgt + P lt slt −
(
P gt x
g
t + P
l
tx
l
t
)
+ µtkt + ch
g
t + bt.
Since a firm with εt > ε
∗
t wants to invest using as many resources as possible, it will not
purchase any asset and will sell all its assets; that is
xgt = x
l
t = 0, s
g
t = h
g
t , s
l
t = h
l
t.
Moreover, it will borrow as much as possible up to the borrowing limit. A firm with εt < ε
∗
t
will not invest. Since pbt = 1/Rft, p
l
t = P
l
t , and p
g
t = P
g
t , the firm is indifferent between saving
and borrowing and is indifferent between between buying and selling assets. We then obtain
the optimal investment rule
it =
{
Rktkt + (P
g
t + c)h
g
t + P
l
th
l
t + µtkt + bt if εt > ε
∗
t
0 otherwise
.
Thus we can derive aggregate investment and the law of motion for capital in equations (20)
and (21), where we have used the market-clearing condition for bonds, i.e.
∫
bjtdj = 0.
Substituting the decision rules back into (A.1) and using the conjectured value function,
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we can derive
qt(εt)kt + φ
g
t (εt)h
g
t + φ
l
t(εt)h
l
t + φ
b
t (εt) bt
= [(1− δ)Qt +Rkt] kt + (P gt + c)hgt + P lthlt + bt
+ max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)[
Rktkt + (P
g
t + c)h
g
t + P
l
th
l
t + bt + µtkt
]
=
{
(1− δ)Qt +Rkt
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
+ µt max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)}
kt
+ (P gt + c)
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
hgt
+P lt
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
hlt +
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
bt.
Matching coefficients yields
qt(εt) = (1− δ)Qt +Rkt max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
+ µt max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
,
φgt (εt) = (P
g
t + c)
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
,
φlt(εt) = P
l
t
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
,
φbt (εt) = 1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
.
Using the preceding definition of Qt, p
g
t , p
l
t and p
b
t and noting that p
g
t = P
g
t , p
l
t = P
l
t , p
b
t = 1/Rft,
we can derive their asset pricing equations given in Proposition 1.
Since firms with εt ≤ ε∗t are indifferent between buying and selling assets, we allow them to
purchase assets so that asset markets can clear∫
εt≤ε∗t
xgt (εt) dF (ε) = [1− F (ε∗t )] (1− pi) ,∫
εt≤ε∗t
xlt (εt) dF (ε) = [1− F (ε∗t )]pi.
Without loss of generality, we can set individual purchasing choice as
xgt =
{
[1−F (ε∗t )](1−pi)
F (ε∗t )
if εt < ε
∗
t
0 otherwise
, xlt =
{
[1−F (ε∗t )]pi
F (ε∗t )
if εt < ε
∗
t
0 otherwise
.
Moreover firms with εt < ε
∗
t are indifferent between saving and borrowing. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Lemma 1 It is straightforward to check that β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
]
decreases
with ε∗. Since
β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
εmax
(
ε
εmax
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
= β < 1, β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
εmin
(
ε
εmin
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
> 1,
where the second inequality comes from Assumption 1, it follows from the intermediate value
theorem that there exists a unique solution, denoted by ε∗b ∈ (εmin, εmax) , to the equation
β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
]
= 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Equation (17) in the steady state gives (26). For P g > 0, we need
1
Rf
= β
[
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
]
< 1.
If follows from equation (18) that P l = 0. By Lemma 1, the condition above is equivalent to
ε∗ > ε∗b . Using Q = 1/ε
∗ and equation (16), we can derive the steady-state capital stock in
equation (27). Using equation (20) in the steady state yields
δK = [αAKα + µK + (1− pi) (P g + c)]
∫ εmax
ε∗
εdF (ε).
Substituting (26) for P g and (27) for K = K (ε∗) into the equation above gives an equation
for ε∗, (28). We need the following lemma to complete the proof.
Lemma 3 For a sufficiently small µ, K (ε∗) increases with ε∗ on (εmin, εmax) .
Proof: Let
h (ε∗) =
1/β − 1 + δ − µ ∫ εmaxε∗ (ε− ε∗) dF (ε)
ε∗ +
∫ εmax
ε∗ (ε− ε∗) dF (ε)
.
We can compute that
h′ (ε∗) =
µ
[
(1− F (ε∗)) ε∗ + ∫ εmaxε∗ (ε− ε∗) dF (ε)]− F (ε∗) (1/β − 1 + δ)[
ε∗ +
∫ εmax
ε∗ (ε− ε∗) dF (ε)
]2 .
For a sufficiently small µ ∈ (εmin, εmax) , h′ (ε∗) < 0. Thus by (27),
K (ε∗) =
[
h (ε∗)
αA
] 1
α−1
increases with ε∗.
Simple algebra shows that the expression
δ∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
−αAK (ε∗)α−1−µ = δ∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
−
(
1
β − 1 + δ
)
1
ε∗ − µ
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
−µ
36
increases with ε∗ on (ε∗b , εmax) . Let D (ε
∗) denote the expression on the left-hand side of (28).
Then since D (ε∗) is the product of the preceding expression and K (ε∗), it increases with ε∗.
We can check that
S (ε∗) ≡ (1− pi) c
Rf (ε∗)− 1
decreases with ε∗ on (ε∗b , εmax) . As ε
∗ decreases to ε∗b , S (ε
∗) approaches infinity since Rf (ε∗b) =
1 by Lemma 1, but D (ε∗b) is finite. As ε
∗ increases to εmax, D (ε∗) approaches infinity, but
the limit of S (ε∗) is finite. By the intermediate value theorem, there is a unique solution to
ε∗ ∈ (ε∗b , εmax) in equation (28).
Differentiating the expressions on the two sides of equation (28) yields
∂D (ε∗)
∂ε∗
∂ε∗
∂µ
−K (ε∗) = ∂S (ε
∗)
∂ε∗
∂ε∗
∂µ
.
We then have
∂ε∗
∂µ
[
∂D (ε∗)
∂ε∗
− ∂S (ε
∗)
∂ε∗
]
= K (ε∗) .
Since ∂D(ε
∗)
∂ε∗ > 0 and
∂S(ε∗)
∂ε∗ < 0 for small µ, we have
∂ε∗
∂µ > 0. Since K (ε
∗) and Rf (ε∗) increase
with ε∗, Y increases with µ and P g decreases with µ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: We can write down an entrepreneur’s decision problem by dynamic
programming as in (A.1) subject to the constraints given in Section 2. We suppress the subscript
j throughout the proof. Conjecture that the value function takes the form as in (A.2). Then
we have
βE
[
Vt+1(kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1)
]
= Qtkt+1 + p
g
th
g
t+1 + p
l
th
l
t+1 + p
b
tbt+1,
where Qt, p
g
t , P
l
t , and p
b
t are defined as in (A.3) and (A.4).
Using the flow-of-funds constraint and the preceding equation, we can derive
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
= Rktkt − it + Pt
(
sgt + s
l
t − xt
)
+ chgt −
bt+1
Rft
+ bt
+Qtkt+1 + p
g
th
g
t+1 + p
l
th
l
t+1 + p
b
tbt+1
= Rktkt − it + Pt
(
sgt + s
l
t − xt
)
+ chgt −
bt+1
Rft
+ bt
+Qt [(1− δ) kt + itεt] + pgt (Θtxt + hgt − sgt )
+plt
[
(1−Θt)xt + hlt − slt
]
+ pbtbt+1
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= [(1− δ)Qt +Rkt] kt + (pgt + c)hgt + plthlt
+ (Qtεt − 1) it +
[
Θtp
g
t + (1−Θt) plt − Pt
]
xt
+ (Pt − pgt ) sgt +
(
Pt − plt
)
slt + bt +
(
pbt −
1
Rft
)
bt+1.
By a similar argument to the proof of Proposition 1, for the entrepreneur’s optimal decisions
to be compatible with a competitive equilibrium, we must have
Pt = Θtp
g
t + (1−Θt)plt, pbt =
1
Rft
.
Thus we have
max
it,slt,s
g
t ,xt,Ct,bt+1
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
= max
it,slt,s
g
t
[(1− δ)Qt +Rkt] kt + (pgt + c)hgt + plthlt + bt
+ (Qtεt − 1) it + (Pt − pgt ) sgt +
(
Pt − plt
)
slt.
Since it ≥ 0, it is optimal for the firm to make real investment if and only if εt ≥ 1/Qt = ε∗t .
When making the investment, the firm will invest as much as possible. By the flow of funds
constraint (6) and the borrowing constraint (7), we have
it = Rktkt + Pt
(
sgt + s
l
t
)
− Ptxt + chgt + bt − Ct −
bt+1
Rft
≤ Rktkt + Pt
(
sgt + s
l
t
)
+ chgt + bt + µtkt − Ptxt.
To leave the maximum resource for investing, the firm will not purchase any asset; that is,
xt = 0. The borrowing constraint must also bind when εt > 1/Qt = ε
∗
t . Thus we obtain the
investment rule
it =
{
Rktkt + Pt
(
sgt + s
l
t
)
+ chgt + bt + µtkt for εt ≥ ε∗t
0 εt < ε
∗
t
.
Substituting this investment rule into the right-hand side of the Bellman equation in (A.1), we
38
can derive that for εt > ε
∗
t ,
max
it,slt,s
g
t ,xt,Ct,bt+1
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
= max
slt,s
g
t
[(1− δ)Qt +Rkt] kt + (pgt + c)hgt + plthlt + bt
+ (Qtεt − 1)
[
Rktkt + Pt
(
sgt + s
l
t
)
+ chgt + bt + µtkt
]
+ (Pt − pgt ) sgt +
(
Pt − plt
)
slt
= max
slt,s
g
t
[(1− δ)Qt +QtεtRkt + µt (Qtεt − 1)] kt + (pgt +Qtεtc)hgt + plthlt
+Qtεtbt + (QtεtPt − pgt ) sgt +
(
QtεtPt − plt
)
slt
= [(1− δ)Qt +QtεtRkt + µt (Qtεt − 1)] kt +QtPtεthlt +Qtεtbt
+ [pgt +Qtεtc+ max (QtPtεt − pgt , 0)]hgt ,
where in the last equality we have used the fact that slt = h
l
t since QtεtPt ≥ Pt ≥ plt and that
sgt = h
g
t if QtPtεt ≥ pgt and sgt = 0, otherwise.
If εt ≤ ε∗t , then it = 0 and we have
max
it,slt,s
g
t ,xt,Ct,bt+1
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
= max
sgt ,s
l
t
[(1− δ)Qt +Rkt] kt + (pgt + c)hgt + plthlt + bt
+ (Pt − pgt ) sgt +
(
Pt − plt
)
slt
= [(1− δ)Qt +Rkt] kt + (pgt + c)hgt + Pthlt + bt,
where the second equality follows from the fact that sgt = 0 since Pt ≤ pgt and that slt = hlt since
Pt ≥ plt.
We now combine the preceding two cases for all εt ∈ [εmin, εmax]. If
Pt ≥ p
g
t
Qtεmax
=
ε∗t
εmax
pgt ,
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then
max
it,slt,s
g
t ,xt,Ct,bt+1
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
=
[
(1− δ)Qt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Rkt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt
]
kt
+
[
pgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
c+QtPt max
(
εt − p
g
t
ptQt
, 0
)]
hgt
+ max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Pth
l
t + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
bt
=
[
(1− δ)Qt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Rkt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt
]
kt
+
[
max
(
εt
pgt / (PtQt)
, 1
)
pgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
c
]
hgt
+ max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Pth
l
t + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
bt.
If
Pt <
pgt
Qtεmax
=
ε∗t
εmax
pgt ,
then
max
it,slt,s
g
t ,xt,Ct,bt+1
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
=
[
(1− δ)Qt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Rkt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt
]
kt
+
[
pgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
c
]
hgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Pth
l
t + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
bt
=
[
(1− δ)Qt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Rkt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt
]
kt
+
[
max
( εt
εmax
, 1
)
pgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
c
]
hgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Pth
l
t + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
bt.
Let ε∗∗t ≡ min
(
pgt
PtQt
, εmax
)
. Then for any εt ∈
(
εmin, εmax
)
, we can write
max
it,slt,s
g
t ,xt,Ct,bt+1
Ct + βEtVt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)
=
[
(1− δ)Qt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Rkt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt
]
kt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Pth
l
t
+
[
max
(
εt
ε∗∗t
, 1
)
pgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
c
]
hgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
bt.
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Substituting the preceding equation into the Bellman equation and using (A.2), we match
coefficients to derive that for any εt ∈ (εmin, εmax),
qt(εt) = (1− δ)Qt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Rkt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt,
φgt (εt) = max
(
εt
ε∗∗t
, 1
)
pgt + max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
c,
φlt(εt) = max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
Pt,
φbt (εt) = max
(
εt
ε∗t
, 1
)
.
Substituting these equations into the previous definitions of Qt, p
g
t , p
l
t, and p
b
t , we obtain their
asset pricing equations as in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: In a frozen equilibrium, Pt = 0 for all t. No firms want to sell any
good assets since the holding value pgt > 0. In a frozen equilibrium, the market for long-term
assets breaks down. We conjecture that the value function Vt takes the following form:
Vt
(
kt, εt, h
g
t , h
l
t, bt
)
= qt(εt)kt + φ
g
t (εt)h
g
t + φ
l
t(εt)h
l
t + φ
b
t(εt)bt.
Then we can write
βE
[
Vt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)]
= Qtkt+1 + p
g
th
g
t+1 + p
l
th
l
t+1 + p
b
tbt+1,
where we define Qt, p
g
t , p
l
t, and p
b
t as before. The Bellman equation is given by
Vt
(
kt, εt, h
g
t , h
l
t, bt
)
= max
it
Ct + βE
[
Vt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)]
(A.5)
subject to (5), bt+1/Rft ≥ −µtkt, and
it = Rktkt + ch
g
t + bt −
bt+1
Rft
− Ct.
Using the flow-of-funds constraint, we can compute the objective function in (A.5) as
Ct + βE
[
Vt+1
(
kt+1, εt+1, h
g
t+1, h
l
t+1, bt+1
)]
= Rktkt − it + chgt +Qt [(1− δ) kt + itεt] + pgthgt+1 + plthlt+1
= [Rkt + (1− δ)Qt] kt + (Qtεt − 1) it + (pgt + c)hgt + plthlt,
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where we have used the fact that hgt+1 = h
g
t = h
g
0 and h
l
t = h
l
t = h
l
0 for all t. We then obtain
the investment rule in the proposition. Substituting this investment rule back into (A.5) and
matching coefficients, we obtain
qt(εt) = (1− δ)Qt +Rkt
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
+ max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
µt,
φgt (εt) = p
g
t + c
[
1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)]
,
φlt(εt) = p
l
t,
φbt (εt) = 1 + max
(
εt
ε∗t
− 1, 0
)
.
Using the definitions of Qt, p
g
t , p
l
t, and p
b
t , we can derive (16), (17), and p
l
t = βEt
(
plt+1
)
. By
the transversality condition, we deduce that plt = 0 for all t. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: By (36), QtPtεt ≤ QtPtεmax < pg. No firms want to sell the good
assets so that ε∗∗t = εmax and Θt = 0. Thus Pt = plt by (31). We then use (29) to derive (33)
and use (30) to derive (32).
We use Proposition 3 to derive equation (44) for aggregate investment. We then obtain
the law of motion for aggregate capital in equation (34). Using (3), (4), and the labor market-
clearing condition Nt = 1, we can derive that
Wt = (1− α)A
(
Kt
Nt
)α
= (1− α)AKαt , Rkt = αA
(
Nt
Kt
)1−α
= αAKα−1.
In addition,
Yt =
∫
yjtdj =
∫
Akαjtn
1−α
jt dj = AK
αN1−α = AKα.
By the decision rule in Proposition 3 and the market-clearing condition for financial assets,∫
xtdF (ε) =
∫ (
sgt + s
l
t
)
dF (ε) ,
we can derive ∫
εt≤ε∗t
xtdF (ε) = pi + (1− pi) [1− F (ε∗∗t )] .
Since xt is indeterminate at the individual firm level, we can set
xjt =
{
pi+(1−pi)[1−F (ε∗∗t )]
F (ε∗t )
if εjt < ε
∗∗
t
0 otherwise
,
for all j. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 6: By Lemma 1, there exists a unique cutoff value ε∗b ∈ (εmin, εmax) to
equation (24). In the bubbly lemon steady state, P > 0 and hence equation (32) is equivalent
to equation (24). This implies that ε∗b is the investment threshold in the bubbly lemon steady
state. By (24) and (33), we can derive pg as in (40). Using equations (16) and (22), we can
show that the steady state capital stock is equal to K (ε∗b) where K (·) is given in (27). Using
equations (22) and (34), we can solve for P as in (41). We need to verify that the condition
0 < P <
ε∗b
εmax
pg
holds in the steady state. But this is equivalent to (39). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 7: In a pooling equilibrium the restriction in (45) must hold. Firms
with εjt ≥ ε∗∗t sell their good assets. By Proposition 3 and the market-clearing conditions for
assets, we can compute Θt as in the proposition. Using the decision rule for investment in
Proposition 3 and aggregating individual decision rules, we obtain (43) and (44). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2: Under Assumption 1, Lemma 1 establishes the existence of a unique
solution ε∗b to equation (24). Since β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
(
ε
ε∗ − 1
)
dF (ε)
)
decreases with ε∗, it follows
that
β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗∗
( ε
ε∗∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
< β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
= 1
for ε∗∗ > ε∗b . Thus we deuce that
lim
ε∗↑ε∗∗
Θ (ε∗∗)
(
ε∗∗
ε∗
)
+ (1−Θ (ε∗∗))β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
< 1
lim
ε∗↓ε∗b
Θ (ε∗∗)
(
ε∗∗
ε∗
)
+ (1−Θ (ε∗∗))β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗
( ε
ε∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
> 1.
Since the expression on the right-hand side of equation (50) decreases continuously with ε∗, it
follows from the intermediate value theorem that there exists a unique solution to ε∗ in (ε∗b , ε
∗∗)
in equation (50). Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8: Following the strategy used in the context, we know pooling equi-
librium can be supported if and only if
0 < c < cP (pi) ,
where cP (pi) = max
ε∗∗∈[ε∗b ,εmax]
Γ (ε∗∗, pi), and
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Γ (ε∗∗, pi) ≡
δK(Φ(ε∗∗))∫ εmax
Φ(ε∗∗) εdF (ε)
− αAK (Φ (ε∗∗))α − µK (Φ (ε∗∗))
(1− pi) + Φ(ε∗∗)ε∗∗
[
pi + (1− pi)
∫ εmax
ε∗∗ εdF (ε)∫ εmax
Φ(ε∗∗) εdF (ε)
][
β
(
1+
∫ εmax
Φ(ε∗∗)
(
ε
Φ(ε∗∗)−1
)
dF (ε)
)
1−β(1+
∫ εmax
ε∗∗ (
ε
ε∗∗−1)dF (ε))
]
As in the proof of Proposition 2 and Lemma 3, for a sufficiently small µ, the expression
δK (ε∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− αA [K (ε∗)]α − µK (ε∗)
increases with ε∗. Thus the numerator of the expression for Γ given above satisfies
δK (ε∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗)α − µK (ε∗)
≥ δK (ε
∗
b)∫ εmax
ε∗b
εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗b)α − µK (ε∗b) = cH > 0
for any ε∗ ≥ ε∗b . In addition, it follows from Lemma 1 that
1− β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗∗
( ε
ε∗∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
> 0
for ε∗∗ > ε∗b so that the denominator of the expression for Γ given above is also positive. We
deduce that
Γ (pi, ε∗∗) ≥ 0
for all ε∗∗ ∈ (ε∗b , εmax) . Since
lim
ε∗∗↓ε∗b
β
(
1 +
∫ εmax
ε∗∗
( ε
ε∗∗
− 1
)
dF (ε)
)
= 1
and other limits are finite, we have
lim
ε∗∗↓ε∗b
Γ (pi, ε∗∗) = 0.
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a solution to ε∗∗ in (ε∗b , εmax) in equation (52).
We can verify that
Γ (εmax) =
cHcL
picH + (1− pi) cL = c
B (pi) ,
where the first equality uses the fact that Φ (εmax) = ε
∗
b and the second uses the definition of
cB (pi) by equation (38). Therefore we know that cp (pi) > cB (pi).
The steady-state capital stock K
(
ε∗p
)
is derived from equation (16) using ε∗p = 1/Q. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 9: We apply Proposition 4. Aggregation leads to the equations for
aggregate capital and investment in the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 10: By equation (16), we can derive the steady-state capital stock
K (ε∗) defined in (27). We need to solve for ε∗. By (22) and (56), we can derive equation (58).
As in the proof of Proposition 8, we know that the right-hand side of (58) strictly increases
with ε∗. In addition, we can show that
lim
ε∗∗↑εmax
δK (ε∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗)α − µK (ε∗) = +∞
and
lim
ε∗↓εmin
δK (ε∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− αAK (ε∗)α − µK (ε∗)
= K (εmin)
[
δ∫ εmax
εmin
εdF (ε)
− 1/β − 1 + δ∫ εmax
εmin
εdF (ε)
]
= K (εmin)
1− 1/β∫ εmax
εmin
εdF (ε)
< 0.
Therefore there exists a unique solution ε∗ ∈ (εmin, εmax) to equation (58) for any c > 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 11: By Lemma 3, for a sufficiently small µ, K (ε∗) increases with ε∗.
To prove K
(
ε∗p
)
> K (ε∗b) > K (ε
∗
a), we only need to show that ε
∗
p > ε
∗
b > ε
∗
a when µ is small
enough. By Lemma 2 and Proposition 8, ε∗p > ε∗b .
By definition,
D (ε∗) ≡ δK (ε
∗)∫ εmax
ε∗ εdF (ε)
− [αAK (ε∗)α − µK (ε∗) + (1− pi) c] .
By (37) and (38), ε∗b satisfies the equation
D (ε∗b) = (1− pi)
(
c¯B (pi)− c) . (A.6)
By Proposition 10, ε∗a satisfies
D (ε∗a) = 0. (A.7)
As shown in Proposition 6, a bubbly lemon steady state equilibrium can be supported if c <
c¯B (pi). Therefore equations (A.6) and (A.7) jointly imply
D (ε∗b) > D (ε
∗
a) . (A.8)
As in the proof of Proposition 2, D (ε∗) strictly increases with ε∗ for a sufficiently small µ.
Then equation (A.8) implies that ε∗b > ε
∗
a. QED.
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